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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, environmental regulatory agencies have been delegated broad regulatory power, often with a minimum of legislative
control. I In addition, courts defer to agency expertise and are reluctant to find an abuse of rule-making or regulatory power. 2 The expansion of administrative power is troubling to citizens who face the
effects of an agency's decision to issue a permit for a hazardous waste
facility or landfill.
Citizens are concerned that agency decision makers have become
1. Agency power has expanded to include greater discretionary power in three
areas of environmental regulation. First, state and federal legislatures delegate
broad authority to administrative agencies to regulate environmental activities, often
with minimal statutory guidance. See Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: InstitutionalDesignsfor Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983).

"[T]he use of sophisticated mathematical and biological models distinguishes modem administrative experts from their Roosevelt-era predecessors.... [The effect of
the use of these models is to] distance a modem agency's reasoning from ordinary
experience and insulate regulatory decisions from generalist review." Id. at 1300.
Second, the range of regulatory alternatives expanded from the traditional command and control approach to an incentive-based approach which encourages voluntary industry compliance. See Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Wastes, 18
ENVTL. L. 505, 513 (1988); Gelpe, Organizing Themes of Environmental Law, 16 WM.

MITCHELL L. REV. 897 (1990). The incentives for the regulated party can range from
decreased taxes and fee structures to a property interest in the amount of reduced
emissions which can be traded or sold to others. Id. at 909.
Third, agency power broadened because of the use of rulemaking negotiations
with the regulated party. See generally Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before FederalAgencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74

GEO. L.J. 1625 (1986) (discussing negotiated rulemaking and administrative
agencies).
2. Courts reviewing technological decision making often defer to agency expertise. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) ("The Administrator may apply his expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but not
completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends among facts, from
theoretical projections from imperfect data, from probative preliminary data not yet
certifiable as 'fact,' and the like."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
See also Glicksman, A Retreat FromJudicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and The Envi-

ronment, 63 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 209 (1987). The author notes that federal courts are
increasingly reluctant to actively promote environmental protection objectives:
"[M]ore recent decisions reflect the belief that an unrestrained judiciary actively
seeking to implement its own notions of public policy infringes improperly upon executive and legislative authority." Id. at 210; Levy & Glicksman, JudicialActivism and
Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343

(1989). The Supreme Court shifted its environmental law decisions from judicial
pro-environmental activism to pro-development. This represents a new emphasis of
deference toward agency interpretation of statutes. Id. at 346; Schuck & Elliott, Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology for, and Report on, New Empirical Research, 42 AD-

MIN. L. REV. 519, 533 (1990) (A twenty year longitudinal study of federal courts
demonstrated "a growing tendency of reviewing courts to defer to agencies ....").
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insulated from accountability to the electorate. 3 In our political culture, citizens value public participation as a means to control and
limit governmental power and are reluctant to delegate collective decisions to administrative agencies and scientific experts.4
For citizens facing the possible health effects of a hazardous landfill, their concept of a just and democratic government is one where
respect for the individual is paramount. 5 Unfortunately, public participation programs 6 and procedures7 have not achieved the kind of
3. See Magat & Schroeder, Administrative Process Reform in a Discretionary Age: The
Role of Social Consequences, 1984 DUKE L.J. 301, 309.
Since the 1960s there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the ability of the
federal government, as represented by administrative agencies, to solve the degradation of the environment. Russell & Gregory, Award of Attorney's Fees in Environmental
Litigation: Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate" Standard, 18 GA. L. REV. 307, 307 (1984).
"People no longer held to the New Deal dream that the ills of society could be cured
by delegating authority to administrative agencies that would creatively regulate
complex social problems in the public interest." Id. at 308.
See also Sunstein, Participation,Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
976, 985-86 (1982).
[In the last twenty years], Congress has delegated considerable discretion to
unelected officials who make regulatory decisions for which the governing

statutes fix only vague limits. This development has placed considerable
strains upon the original constitutional understanding that public officials
would be more or less directly accountable to the electorate ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
4. Fiorino, EnvironmentalRisk and Democratic Process: A CriticalReview, 14 COLUM.

J. ENVTL. L. 501, 532-34 (1989).
5. See generally Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1986)

(discussing citizens' view that health risks should not be weighed against economic
benefits).
6. The most common public participation programs, derived from state procedures or the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) involve public hearings or
meetings. At least three major defects of public meetings have been identified: (1)
participants are not from a broad cross-section of the public; (2) the most successful
citizen inputs are found in programs which require the least scientific expertise; and
(3) most participatory programs are geared to intervention at the local level which
leaves policy decisions unaffected. See generally Crosby, Kelly & Schaefer, Citizen
Panels:A New Approach to Citizen Participation,48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170 (1986); but see
Rosener, Making Bureaucrats Responsive: A Study of the Impact of Citizen Participationand
Staff Recommendations on Regulatory Decision Making, 42 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 339 (1982).

In a study of 1,816 public hearings held by the California Coastal Commission, the
author found that citizen participation was a variable which significantly increased the
probability of citizen success in the Commission denial of a permit.
Additional barriers to effective citizen participation have also been identified.
These include: (1) structural barriers, such as administrative procedures and rules
that do not require participation; see Bacow & Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to
Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. Em'TL. L. REV. 265, 27072 (1982); Saunders, Interpretive Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposalfor

Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346; (2) economic barriers, such as the costs of
hiring scientific experts and lawyers to challenge agency action in court; see Boyer &
Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits
Under FederalEnvironmentalLaws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 839-40, 851 (1985); (3) scien-
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participatory democracy demanded by a public concerned about increased health and environmental risks.8 The public's inability to influence 9 agency decision making encourages individuals and
communities to undertake strategic behaviorto designed to block the
proposed activity.
This Comment tests one hypothesis for the failure of public participation to influence environmental agency decision making. The hypothesis is that citizens bring a form of information to the decisiontific barriers, such as the burden of challenging health risk data; see S.

KRIMSKY & A.
PLOUGH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: COMMUNICATING RISKS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 300

(1988); and (4) communication barriers, such as the use of technical terminology
when talking to citizens about health risks. Id. at 298.
7. The APA comes under increasing attack as failing to provide the most effective means for public participation in agency decision making. Pressure for reform
has intensified in recent years because of the broad scope of agency rulemaking and
agency discretionary power, and the resulting social impact. Magat & Schroeder,
supra note 3, at 303-08.
8. See Kraft, The Impact of Citizen Participationon Hazardous Waste Policy Implementation: The Case of Clermont County, Ohio, 14 POL'Y STUD.J. 52 (1985) (analyzing Clermont

County's installation of a hazardous waste disposal site); McGarity, Risk and Trust: The
Role of Regulatory Agencies, 16 ENvTL. L. REV. 10,198, 10,201-02 (1986) (discussing
public participation in policymaking); Nober, FederalHighways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory of Public Choice and Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.

229 (1990) (discussing the public's role in planning highway construction); Paehlke,
Participationin EnvironmentalAdministration: Closing the Open Door? 14 ALTERNATIVES 43,

44-48 (1987) (discussing the public's role in environmental administrative law).
9. The term "influence" is used in this paper to connote a sharing of agency
authority with local citizens. Citizens value public participation as a means to obtain
"sufficient information to evaluate risks, opportunity for questioning the existence of
such hazards, and a voice in their control." Paehlke, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Environmentalism, 10 ENvrL. ETHIcS 291, 303 (1988).
This viewpoint is in contrast to that of some commentators who regard citizen
participation as principally an informing-the-agency function. See, e.g., Andreen,
Defusing the "Not in my Back Yard" Syndrome: An Approach to FederalPreemption of State and
Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB DisposalFacilities, 63 N.C.L. REV. 811, 847 (1985)

(noting that broad citizen participation power can impede national environmental
goals); E. STOCKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 257-66 (1978).
The critics of broadened citizen participation argue that agencies would be unduly
hampered by having to share decisional power with the public. After all, the need for
administrative agencies stems from the inability and inefficiency of individuals and
communities to distribute risk burdens on their own. Id. at 305-08. See also Hanes,
Citizen Participationand Its Impact upon Prompt and Responsible AdministrativeAction, 24 Sw.

LJ. 731 (1970). "It is reasonable to anticipate that this unprecedented participation
by individual citizens . . .and groups on their behalf will tax the time, energy, and
ingenuity of the administrative agencies and result in major delays in the consummation of proceedings of great economic and social consequence." Id. at 738.
10. Strategic behavior is the use of holdout strategies by citizens to bargain for
their preferred outcome. For example, citizens frustrated by the lack of agency sensitivity to community concerns may delay agency proceedings by resorting to litigation
or administrative hearings. See, e.g., Note, Enhancing the Community's Role in Landfill
Siting in Illinois, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 97, 101-03 (1987) (discussing use of local home rule

areas to block Illinois land fill actions).
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making process that environmental regulatory agencies are unable to
assimilate. To test this hypothesis, a survey was conducted to assess
the impact of scientific decision making on citizens and agency staff.
THESIS

The failure of citizens to influence environmental decision makers
is directly related to the inability of the scientific decision-making
process to accommodate cultural and political rationality in agency
decision making. Although public participation procedures, such as
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), legitimized lay access to
agency proceedings, the specialized language and the need for scientific proof seriously hinders the ability of lay citizens to influence
health or environmental agency action. II
Environmental regulatory agencies12 use a scientific model as the
basis for decision making.13 In this paper, "scientific rationality" refers to agency use of a scientific model and its resulting impact on
citizen participation. "Political rationality"i4 is the process by which
citizens communicate their concerns to government; "cultural rationality"i5 is the process by which citizens define the meaning of
11. Citizens are at a serious disadvantage in trying to challenge industry or
agency scientific data. One author found, "While the regulated industry usually has
access to the best and perhaps the only relevant data, the data base of public interest
groups is relatively poor. Thus, they either must seek to discredit industry statistics,
often without alternative data sources of high quality, or must take the industry data
as given and seek to draw contrary inferences from it." Schuck, Public Interest Groups
and The Policy Process, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 132, 137 (1977).

12. This Comment discusses only environmental regulatory agencies. For convenience, the term "agencies" is used to refer to environmental regulatory agencies.
13. The term "scientific model" is used in this Comment to describe a form of
reasoning which consists of several analytic steps. First, a theory is developed to
explain the health or environmental effects from a given chemical or substance. Second, the theory is used to conduct experiments, usually animal studies, to determine
the degree of health effects likely to harm humans or the environment. Third, a
mathematical model and equation are deduced from this theory to predict the
probability of harm. The resulting model, along with any assumptions and extrapolations from experimental data, is used by regulators as the basis for the desired
regulatory standard. A detailed discussion of scientific decision making is beyond the
scope of this Comment. An excellent discussion can be found in Latin, Good Science,
Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988).
14. Political rationality is the process by which citizens communicate their ideals
of representative democracy, fairness, and equity in distributing the'effects of environmental action on individual citizens.
15. Cultural rationality includes several key factors that affect the citizen's perception of risk:
(a) Voluntary risks are accepted more readily than those that are
imposed....

(b)

Risks under individual control are accepted more readily than those

under government control ....
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health risks for themselves. Political and cultural rationality are interrelated. Once citizens have defined the risks as they understand
them, they use the political process to communicate those risks to
government. 16
Citizens generally understand risks in cultural and political terms,
such as the fairness of exposing a group of people, without their consent, to health risks. They often challenge agency action on the basis
of cultural and political rationality. Such cultural and political rationality are not readily assimilated into a scientific decision-making
process which relies upon empirical and theoretical data as the basis
for agency action.' 7
Scientists regard health and environmental risks in measurable
and definable terms, such as the probability of harm from a technological risk.18 Policy makers and regulators prefer to use the scientific form of rationality for determining agency action because the
experts' perception of risk is often deemed more "rational and more
consistent with society's interests than the 'subjective' judgments of
the less technically sophisticated public."19
(d)

Risk information... from trustworthy sources is more readily believed

than information from untrustworthy sources....
(f) Natural risks seem more acceptable than artificial risks....
(k) Risks that are well understood by science are more acceptable than
those that are not....
The greater the number and seriousness of these factors, the greater
the likelihood of public concern about the risk, regardless of the data.
EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION: THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT

AND NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 211-12 (V. Covello, D. McCallum, & M.

Pavlova, eds. 1989) (emphasis omitted) (proceedings of workshop on the role of government in health risk).
16. Citizen reactions are often dismissed by agencies as irrational. Agency staff
conclude that citizens are unable to understand the scientific aspects of risk. As a
consequence, both agency scientists and citizens become frustrated in attempts to
communicate with each other over risk issues. Agency scientists and policy makers
feel their expertise, experience, and commitment are unappreciated by the communities they seek to serve. Citizens may also be outraged by what they interpret as the
agency's condescending attitude and insensitivity to community concerns. Id. at 210.
17. Agency staff interpret cultural expressions of risk as "irrational" or as an obstacle to overcome rather than as an expression of fundamental democratic values.
For example, "State agencies . .. must retain the power to override local officials
when irrationalpublic opposition prevents reasoned decision making. A more efficient siting

process would insure that local siting boards approve or reject a site solely on the
basis of local need and environmental impact." Note, supra note 10, at 99 (emphasis
added).
18. Latin, supra note 13, at 89 (discussing scientific decision making).
19. Fiorino, supra note 4, at 532. See KRIMSKY & PLOUGH, supra note 6, at 298-

306.
Agency policy makers often consider one of the following actions: "(1) circumventing the public by avoiding disclosure, by distraction, by preemption, or by citing
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Numerous public perceptions about health or environmental risk
are inconsistent with so-called objective or scientific information.
For example, people are said to exhibit too little concern about some
hazards, such as smoking and exposure to sunlight, and too much
concern about others, such as nuclear power and pesticides. These
observations have important implications for agencies communicating with the public about hazardous activities.20
Part one of this Comment explores the use of scientific decision
making by environmental regulators. Part two sets out the results of
the survey which examined the effect of scientific rationality on public participation. Finally, part three suggests ways in which the negative effect of scientific decision making on public participation can be
minimized.
PART I
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY DECISION MAKING

Environmental agencies use scientific decision making because it is
a rational process, capable of balancing the conflicts between the
regulated party and the community they serve. Agencies serve three
different constituencies. First, agencies serve the general public interest expressed through the legislature. The goal is to achieve
health and environmental quality. Second, agencies serve the interests of the communities directly affected by agency action. Citizens
are concerned about agency bias or "capture" 2 1 by industry interests. For citizens, agency decisions that appear to favor industry interests seriously erode the legitimacy of the agency to regulate.22
social contract doctrine... ;(2) appealing to some exemplary and independent authoritative body that will apply the rational decision framework and secure public
confidence; or (3) communicating the risks and educating the public in thinking
about the problem the way the experts do .....
Id. at 303. Commentators argue that
none of these responses is appropriate; see also Murphy & Hoffman, Current Models for
Improving Public Representation in the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 391 (1976)
(discussing models used for improving public involvement in administrative law) ;
Sproul, Public Participationin the Point Conception LNG Controversy: Energy Wasted or En-

ergy Well-Spent? 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 73 (1986) (discussing California residents' involvement in liquified natural gas permitting process).
20. See KRIMSKV & PLOUGh, supra note 6.
21. The term "capture" has been used to describe the tendency in public regulation for the regulators to be co-opted by those they regulate, coming to share their
values and growing wary of conflict. See, e.g., Rickson, Dimensions of Environmental
Management: Legitimation of Government Regulation by Industrial Managers, 14 ENV'T &
BEHAV.

15 (1977) (analyzing government-industry relationship). But see Stewart, The

Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 655, 664-65 (arguing that industry influence or "capture" represents a socially
beneficial response by regulators and the regulated party in that it reduces the incidence of litigation and encourages settlement).
22. McGarity, supra note 8, at 10,198; see Stewart, supra note 21, at 655.
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When an agency adopts a cost-benefit approach which favors industry, the agency's purpose in promoting the public interest in health
and environmental quality is questioned.23 Third, agencies serve the
regulated party, e.g., industry. Industry is concerned about political
pressure exerted by communities on agencies to achieve health and
environmental quality at any cost. 24

Environmental agencies must balance the competing interests of
the community and of the regulated parties to avoid the perception
of bias. Scientific decision making enhances an agency's ability to
balance these competing interests in three ways.
First, scientific decision making relies primarily on the use of objective data, thus avoiding the perception of undue bias toward
either industry or citizens.25 Agencies use a risk assessment process
based upon the best available scientific theories,26 carried out "independently from considerations of the consequences of regulatory ac23. The use of cost-benefit approaches to regulating hazardous wastes tends to
"undermine the legitimacy of administrative and regulatory processes," by eliminating several ethical, moral, and political factors, and by reducing the credibility of
agencies and their decisions. See Fiorino, supra note 4, at 523-25.
24. However, a strong level of public concern about environmental quality fosters agency independence from industry. One commentator argues that, without
strong public support, government agencies become increasingly dependent on industry for the legitimation they need to justify their existence with state and federal
legislators. As industry dominates agency policy, agencies become less aggressive in
enforcing regulation because of declining public interest and political pressure.
Rickson, supra note 21, at 35; see also Davis, supra note 1, at 655 (discussing various
approaches to environmental management within the limits imposed by political and
organizational factors).
25. One example of an administrative body using scientific decision-making is
the California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act Scientific Advisory
Panel. The Panel was developed to provide state officials with scientific expertise and
"to insure that regulatory decisions are based on scientific fact rather than political
opinion." Shaffer, Improving California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
Scientific Advisory Panel Through Regulatory Reform, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (1989);
see also Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the Interface Between Science and Law, 14 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 343 (1989) (discussing the risk assessment process which employs scientific
information and is used by the legal community); Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DuKE L.J.
288 (discussing the effectiveness of the FDA's panel of three scientists which perform
the role of an administrative law judge).
26. Latin, supra note 13, at 92. Latin argues that the EPA has adopted a modified
scientific approach to regulating potential hazardous substances.
Unlike in pure scientific research, where the proper response to uncertainty
is reservation of judgment pending the development of adequate data and
testable hypotheses, the risk-assessment process cannot be suspended without significant social consequences. A finding that a vital issue is currently
indeterminate would be entirely consistent with the practice of good science, but 'nodecision' on a possible toxic hazard inescapably is a decision
that promotes interests which benefit from the regulatory status quo.
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tion."27 Risk assessment emphasizes the use of scientific theories
and empirical data to explain the nature and degree of risks an activity poses to humans or to the environment.28 Risk assessment is
used in agency rulemaking, permit, and compliance proceedings.29
Once the risks are assessed, the agency then takes the information
collected and applies economic considerations, technological feasibility, and social objectives to arrive at the final regulatory standard
or permit decision.30 This process is known as risk management.
Policy makers believe that at the risk management stage, public participation would be most effective in sensitizing the agency to the
political and cultural consequences of agency action. Citizens could
take an active role in influencing the risk management component of
agency decisions.
27. EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992
(1986).
A political approach to risk assessment would encourage confrontation instead
of consensus. Industry representatives would argue for a theory minimizing regulatory costs, and environmentalists would argue for minimizing health and ecological
risks irrespective of regulatory costs. Latin, supra note 13, at 129; see also Goldstein,
supra note 25, at 343-45 (1989) (arguing confrontation detracts from the pursuit of
scientific truth).
28. See Crawford-Brown & Pearce, Sufficent Proof in the ScientificJustifation of EnvironmentalActions, 11 ENvL. ETHics 153, 154-59 (1989) (discussing the various dimensions necessary in risk analysis).
29. For example, in Minnesota, the Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) is the central regulatory body for the control of air, water, and solid waste disposal in the state.
The MPCA assesses risks when it promulgates rules for
air quality by promoting, in the most practicable way possible, the use of
energy sources and waste disposal methods which produce or emit the least
air contaminants consistent with the agency's overall goal of reducing all
forms of pollution.... Such standards of air quality shall be premised upon
scientific knowledge of causes as well as effects based on technically substantiated criteria and commonly accepted practices.
MINN. STAT. § 116.07, subd. 2 (1990).
30. In Minnesota, the risk management component requires the consideration of
additional factors. "In exercising all its powers the pollution control agency shall
give due consideration to the establishment, maintenance, operation and expansion
of business, commerce, trade, industry, traffic, and other economic factors" affecting
the feasibility and practicability of any proposed action. Id. § 116.07, subd. 6.
Risk management was originally conceived as a way for the agency to share decision-making power with the public. See KRIMSKY & PLOUGH, supra note 6, at 302.
However, in practice the concept has been difficult to apply. See Crosby, Kelly &
Schaefer, supra note 6, at 170; see also Ethridge, Agency Responses to Citizen Participation
Requirements: An Analysis of the Tennessee Experience, 14 MIDWEST REV. PUB. ADMIN. 95
(1980). The author proposes:
[T]he more 'technical' agencies, may perceive that they have relatively less
discretion in their rule-making decisions. It is more likely that administrators in these agencies would feel that physical, legal, or fiscal constraints
allowed little latitude in rule making, and that public participation would
simply encourage discussion of administrative alternatives which are impracticable or impossible.
Id. at 101.
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The ability, however, of policy makers and scientists to make this
"sharp distinction between scientific and social policy dimensions of
toxics regulation" has been challenged.S1 Instead, the science and
policy distinction serves to limit the influence of public participation
in agency risks assessment.3 2 As a result, agency expertise is enhanced at the expense of public participation in and acceptance of
agency decisions.
A second reason is that scientific decision making fits the rational
structtre of administrative rulemaking and policy analysis.33 Scientific rationality allows environmental agencies to measure, in an empirical sense, the success of agency regulations in achieving the
desired state of environmental or human health.34 In this manner,
the legitimacy of agency authority to impose controls on the regu3
lated party is enhanced. 5
31. Latin, supra note 13, at 89. "The illusion that risk assessment is a purely
scientific activity reduces the visibility and political accountability of policy judgments
that often guide regulatory decisions on toxic hazards." Id. at 93-94 (emphasis deleted). "Risk assessment is not driven by the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake,
the explicit goal of science, but by the need to decide whether potentially severe
health hazards should be allowed to continue or whether high control costs should
be imposed ... " Id. at 92. "[Tlhousands of lives and billions of dollars in regulatory
costs may depend on an agency's choice of controversial risk-assessment principles."
Id. at 95; see also McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729,
733 (1979) ("Many highly technical questions that are cast in scientific terms cannot
for various practical or moral reasons be answered by science.").
32. Paehlke, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Environmentalism, 10 ENVTL. ETHics, 291,

298 (1988). The author noted:
[B]ureaucracies, almost by definition, seek silence, and if open to participation, prefer managed participation. As Max Weber observed early in this
century: "Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of 'secret
sessions': insofar as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism."
Id. (quoting H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233 (1946)).
33. Auerbach, Bonfield on State Administrative Rulemaking: A Critique, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 543, 545 (1987). See also West, InstitutionalizingRationality in Regulatory Administration, 1983 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 326. Agency decision making is held to a standard

that emphasizes substantive rationality, focusing on the persuasiveness of the
agency's articulated justification for a regulation and the sufficiency of the factual
support that underlies it. West notes several recent developments in administrative
law supporting the need for a rational decision-making process: (1) an increased reliance on rulemaking as a form of policy making; (2) judicialized rulemaking procedures to assure the integrity of the decision-making process; and (3) the use of costbenefit analysis, the attractiveness of which relates to its "seeming objectivity and its
enlistment of science in the pursuit of sound government policy." d. at 329-32;
Teeguarden, Benefit-Cost Analysis in National Forest System Planning: Policy, Uses, and Limitations, 17 ENVTL. L. 393 (1987).

34. Davis, supra note 1, at 514-16.
35. Id.
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The third reason is that agency action grounded in empirical evidence of risks to human or environmental health provides a basis for
adopting a particular environmental standard. For environmental
regulators charged with the legislative mandate to protect society
from health or environmental risks, the inference that an activity
poses a risk to human or environmental health carries with it "an
ethical obligation to act as if the inference might be true."3 6
The emphasis on scientific decision making by administrative
agencies, however, can create a significant barrier to achieving the
goals of public participation. The scientific decision-making process
fails to integrate political or cultural values, the principal contribution of public participation, into the decision-making process. 3 7
II.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING

The use of scientific decision making by environmental agencies

helps explain why citizen participation has had minimal success in
influencing agency action, especially at the local or community
level.38 In setting health risks standards the scientist focuses on a

narrow range of risks parameters with emphasis on scientific inputs
rather than on cultural and political inputs.39
Cultural perceptions of health risks embrace a broader concept of
risk.40 Health risks that are voluntarily assumed are accepted more
readily than those that are imposed on the community. 4 ' Frequently, the expression of cultural rationality is at odds with the rationality of technical experts. 42 The conflict often results in the
technical experts attempting to communicate the risks and to educate the public to think about risks in the same way as the experts do,
and to bring public perception into conformity with scientific ration36. Crawford-Brown & Pearce, supra note 28, at 166.
37. See KRIMSKY & PLOUGH, supra note 6, at 306. "Lay people bring many more
factors into a risk event than do scientists. For technical experts, the event is denuded of elements that are irrelevant to the analytical model. Many events that are
deemed to have very low or insignificant risks by experts are viewed as serious
problems by the laity." Id. at 305.
38. See supra notes 6 and 16 and accompanying text. "An institutionalized group
is one that is regarded as a legitimate and recurring actor by agency officials. State
and local citizen groups seem less successful than national ones in developing institutionalized working arrangements with agencies." Berry, Beyond Citizen Participation.
Effective Advocacy Before Administrative Agencies, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 463, 464
(1981). Local citizen groups need to become more aggressive in establishing regular
channels of communication with agency staff. See id. at 464-65.
39. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
41. "Health risks under individual control are accepted more readily than those
under government control, and health risks that seem fair are more acceptable than
those that seem unfair." EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 15, at 211.
42. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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ality.43 Yet, however precise the calculation of risks regarding the
exposure to a given chemical, whether one chooses to run such risks
is a value question which the public is uniquely qualified and compe-

tent to answer. If the goal of citizen participation is to foster participatory democracy by affording citizens a voice in decisions that

affect their lives, then the scientific decision-making process must accommodate community values in agency decision making.

In the vast majority of environmental decision making, citizen participation becomes a dominant force only in the final stages, long
after formal rules are proposed.44 The majority of citizens become
aware of an environmental issue only when their community is faced

with the effects of an agency's decision to issue a permit for a landfill
or other undesirable activity. At this stage in the decision-making
process, these facts, inferences, and assumptions, marshalled by an

agency in support of its decision, take on the characteristics of an
irrebuttable presumption of validity in favor of the agency-a presumption that citizens at the community level rarely have the scien-

tific or legal expertise to challenge.45
43. See

KRIMSKY & PLOUGH, supra note 6, at 303.
44. For example, in Minnesota, a proposed rule must be noticed and published
in the State Register. All interested parties have thirty days to respond to the proposed rule, or twenty-five or more persons may request an administrative hearing to
present testimony concerning the proposed rule. MINN. STAT. § 14.22 (1990).
For the time period ofJanuary 1989 to March 1990, the author counted nineteen
proposed rules which were published in the State Register. The subject matter included water quality permit fees, the list of priorities for hazardous substances and
pollutants, open-burning restrictions, and rules relating to hazardous waste facility
amendments.
45. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "Earth Protector has
identified no experts, has submitted no new evidence and has cited no convincing
authority that would demonstrate that a contested case hearing would assist the
MPCA in making a final determination on the permit amendment." In re Amendment
No. 4 to Air Emission Facility Permit No. 2021-85-OT-1, 454 N.W.2d 427,430 (Minn.
1990). In this case, Northern States Power company filed a request for amendment
of its operating permit to allow the installation of new pollution control equipment.
Id. at 428. An environmental group, Earth Protector, brought a petition for a contested case hearing which the Pollution Control Agency denied. Id. at 429. The
court of appeals had reversed the trial court, concluding that such a hearing would
aid the agency in making its final permit determination. Id.
In Minnesota, a contested case hearing is held when the person requesting the
hearing has met three requirements. First, the party must raise a material issue of
fact or of the application of facts to law related to the terms of the permit. Second,
the agency must have jurisdiction to decide the issues presented. Finally, there must
be a "reasonable basis" underlying the issues of fact or law raised by the person
requesting the hearing which would assist the agency in making a final determination
on the permit application. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals finding that "the
mere fact that some evidence may exist as to beneficial alternatives" is insufficient to
require a contested case hearing. Id. at 430; see In re Proposed N. States Power Co.
Willmarth Indus. Solid Waste Incinerator Ash Storage Facility, 459 N.W.2d 922, 923
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To make matters worse, the scope of risk management decisions
that agencies can entertain at the state and local level are limited by
fiscal, legal, and economic resources. For example, agency decision
makers have limited authority to impose additional pollution abatement controls once the regulated party has already satisfied the permit and regulatory requirements for licensing. As a result, citizens
are left to challenge what little amount of discretionary power agencies retain over environmental decisions after formal rules have been
adopted, 46 after local government land use and zoning decisions are
considered,47 and after compliance with state and federal laws.
The public response to barriers to public participation is threefold: (1) citizens are suspicious of and no longer accepting of scientific competence as a sufficient basis for decision making;48 (2) they
become cynical and feel powerless to influence agency decisions that
(Minn. 1990) (denying a contested case hearing to Minnesota Citizens Concerned
with Protecting Environmental Quality because of failure to sustain its burden of scientific proof); see also Ogden, Analysis of Three Current Trends in Administrative Law: Reducing Administrative Delay, Expanding Public Participation, and Increasing Agency
Accountability, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 553, 565 (1980); Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing
Regulatory Enforcement, A PreliminaryAssessment of Citizen Suits under FederalEnvironmental
Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 839-40 (1985).
46. In Minnesota, once formal rules have been adopted, citizens may challenge
agency action through a contested case hearing or court challenge. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 14.57 and 14.63 (1990). In the area of technological decision making, citizens
have not been very successful in challenging agency action. See cases cited supra note
45. Citizens may also challenge agency action under the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 1 16B.01-. 13 (1990).
Citizens, however, have had limited success under these statutory provisions. See
Citizens Against Power Plant Pollution, Inc. v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Bd., 305
N.W.2d 575, 583 (Minn. 1981) (denying administrative challenge under Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act); Floodwood-Fine Lakes Citizens Group v. Minnesota
Envtl. Quality Council, 287 N.W.2d 390, 397-98 (Minn. 1979) (finding procedural
requirements for administrative challenge under the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act fulfilled).
47. In recent years, local governments, by passing ordinances or by amending
zoning laws, have attempted to prevent landfills and other undesirable activities in
their communities. Courts have struck down these efforts under doctrines of preemption, conflict of law, and constitutional violation. See generally Andreen, supra
note 9. In Minnesota, local governments may establish stationary source standards
for air quality, sound, or hazardous waste emission which are more stringent than
those set by the MPCA. MINN. STAT. § 116.07, subd. 4 (1990). However, local governments may not set standards which conflict or are inconsistent with standards set
by the pollution control agency. Id. § 116.07, subd. 2. See Northern States Power
Co. v. City of Granite Falls, 463 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (striking
down ordinance with 1,500 foot setback rule prohibiting application of a permit to
burn PCB oil).
48. Nelkin & Pollack, The Politics of Participationand the Nuclear Debate in Sweden, the
Netherlands, andAustria, 25 PuB. POL. 333, 353 (1977), quoted in Fiorino, supra note 4, at
517.
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affect their lives;49 and (3) they use the political and legal process to
"fight for their preferred outcome as a matter of principle," 50
thereby increasing the transaction costs of reaching a negotiated settlement. The public's feelings of frustration and anger become directed at agency staff, local government, and the political process.
Agency staff members often find themselves in the untenable position of having to balance community health concerns with the welfare of the general public. For example, a landfill will benefit the
public, even if the landfill presents some degree of health risks to the
community. Before the agency can issue the permit for the landfill, it
must weigh the health risks to the community against the benefits to
the general public. But, as one observer noted: "We cannot trust
those who would subject us to risk to do so for our benefit. On the
other hand, we still want the freedom to impose some risk upon ourselves and others."51 The agency thus becomes a battleground of
conflicting interests: the community against the general public good,
the public good against the need to regulate industry, and the need
of industry to satisfy the market demand for goods. Agency resources are ill equipped to moderate the conflicts between these
competing interests.
The dilemma becomes how to integrate community input into
agency decision making without destroying the balance between
public and private interests. The dilemma is likely to persist. As
William Ruckelshaus, former EPA Administrator, noted: "The question before us is not whether there is going to be a sharing, whether
we will have participatory democracy with regard to the management
of risk, but how."52

PART II
I.

THE STUDY5

3

This section of the Comment is divided into three parts. Part one
discusses the methodology of the study, demographics of the study
49. See OLSEN, PARTICIPATORY PLURALISM 13-36 (1982).
50. Stewart, supra note 21, at 674.

51. McGarity, Risk and Trust: The Role of Regulatory Agencies, 16 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,198, 10,200 (1986).
52. KRIMSKY & PLOUGH, supra note 6, at 3 (quoting Ruckelshaus, Overview of the
Problem: CommunicatingAbout Risk, in RISK COMMUNICATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RISK COMMUNICATION (J. Davies, V. Covello, and F. Allen,
eds. 1987)).
53. A copy of the survey questions and raw data used in the study is available in
the William Mitchell Law Review office. Individual responses, however, are confidential
and cannot be released without the author's permission.
The percentages have been rounded up from decimal point five. Because not all
questions were answered by all participants, the percentages may not add up to
100%.
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viewpoints about the Minnesota
Part two discusses the predicted
on citizen participation. Finally,
to the findings of the study.

Methodology

Two groups actively involved in the environmental decision-making process were selected to test the impact of scientific decision
making on public participation. The first group consisted of staff
members involved in agency decision making at the MPCA.54 The
second group consisted of citizens from across the state randomly
selected from agency mailing lists, environmental groups, and those
who attend agency meetings. 55
The survey consisted of thirty questions. Twenty questions were
matched,5 6 and nine were identical. Because citizen participation in
agency decision making is a complex and multifaceted topic, respondents were surveyed at a random point in time, with no specific environmental issue in mind. It was anticipated that by capturing a
general sense of the issues facing both citizen and agency participants a control survey would not be necessary.
In analyzing the data, the responses to several questions were not
used because the responses indicated the question may have been
too ambiguous. In addition, the sample size for agency respondents
was small. Consistency of responses across agency divisions, however, indicated the high quality of the responses.
B.

Demographics of the Study Participants

The participants in the citizen survey were 58% male and 42%
female. The ages of citizen participants were almost evenly divided
across all age groups, with 87% between the ages of twenty-three
and sixty years, and 12% between the ages of sixty-one and seventy54. Staff members were chosen because of their involvement with public participation and scientific decision making. Fifty members were selected from five divisions: Hazardous Waste, Water Quality, Environmental Support, Air Quality, and
Ground Water and Solid Waste.
55. A total of 95 citizens were surveyed.
56. The same question was asked from the perspective of the citizen and of the
agency staff. For example, citizens were asked if they agreed, strongly agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the following statement: "Open public meetings
are the best way for the Pollution Control Agency to understand community concerns." Pollution Control Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 8(1) [hereinafter Citizen
Survey]. Correspondingly, agency staff were asked if they agreed, strongly agreed,
disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the following statement: "Open public meetings are the best way to collect information about community environmental concerns." Pollution Control Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 13(1) [hereinafter Agency
Survey].
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five years. Over 71% of the citizen participants were college graduates, and 15% worked in scientific fields, such as chemistry or biology. Most were active in some form of local or national
environmental groups, with 36% reporting affiliation with at least
two groups. In addition, citizen survey respondents had on average
been exposed to at least four public meetings of the MPCA.
The participants in the agency survey were 65% male and 35%
female. The agency survey participants were on average younger
than citizen survey participants. The majority of survey participants
were between the ages of thirty-six and forty-five, with 12% over the
age of forty-six. Educational achievement was high: 99% of the
agency participants had attained college or graduate degrees. Approximately 70% of agency respondents work directly with the risk
assessment process. On average, agency participants had attended
five public meetings of the MPCA in the last twelve months. Agency
staff had on average twenty-two public contacts and twenty industry
contacts per month. Survey response rates were high with 68% of
the agency staff sampled responding and with 74% of citizens responding to the citizen survey.
C.

The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency

The MPCA is unique among state regulatory agencies. Almost all
agency authority is vested in a board of nine lay citizens. Citizens are
appointed by the governor, with the consent of the state senate, to
serve four-year terms. 57 The citizen board of the MPCA may have
several beneficial effects on public participation. First, the need for
agency staff to think through a decision and present it to a citizen
board for approval at open public meetings enhances the public's
ability to understand the decision-making process.5 8 Second, the citizen board provides the public with a greater voice in agency decisions.59 The survey findings support the positive influences of a
citizen board on public participation.
The majority of agency respondents-78%7-believed the citizen
board promotes public participation in agency decision making. Yet,
some agency staff members believed that board members were more
57. MINN. STAT. §§ 116.02(2), 15.0575 (1990); see also Gelpe, Citizen Boards as Regulatory Agencies, 22 URB. LAw. 451, 454 (1990).
58. Gelpe, supra note 57.
59. Id. at 458.
[Plublic opinions may be heard more carefully by a citizen agency than by
professional bureaucrats. The existence of the citizen board as the final
agency decision maker also induces the professional staff of that agency to
be more receptive to public input. The staff's need to respond to a citizen
on a regular basis is likely to create a culture of listening to nonprofessionals.
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responsive to citizen concerns than to agency concerns. One agency
respondent said, "Technical staff are often frustrated by board decisions which appear to be based on emotion rather than technical
data." 60 Another commented, "The board's interest in meeting citizen concerns often places undue workloads on the staff who still
have all the commitments mandated by the legislature, rules, the
EPA, and other promises to citizens, developers .... "61
Conversely, citizens were skeptical of the objectivity of the citizen
board, with 58% believing that "the board is too close to the agency
to understand a citizen's point of view." 6 2 One citizen noted, "The
board tends to give a much greater deference to the opinions expressed by the PCA staff than to the opinions expressed by the public." 63 Another stated, "I don't believe that the PCA board's
closeness to staff inhibits understandingbut I do believe that there is
insufficient counter weight to the staff's easy access in the decision
making process." 6 4
D.

Theory

An analysis of the scientific decision-making model suggests that
citizen cultural perceptions of risk are not readily assimilated into
agency decision making because cultural values do not fit the scientific model of rationality. This general proposition illustrates at least
three possible effects of scientific rationality on citizen participation.
First, technical or scientific data brought by citizens to agency
meetings have little substantive impact on agency action. In determining risk assessment parameters under the scientific model, each
inference about possible health or environmental risk must be warranted by evidence and must be subject to extensive scientific scrutiny before being adopted in a regulatory standard. The final
regulatory standard or measurement thus represents the "best possible science." The consideration of additional scientific data later in
the process would be inefficient and unnecessary. Once a regulatory
standard is adopted, the agency has little incentive to reopen the debate about the choice of inference or assumptions selected in the
final standard. Unfortunately, citizens often become involved in an
environmental issue long after the formal rules were adopted.
60. Response to Question 19, "Is there anything else you would like
with regard to the Pollution Control Agency?" Agency Survey, App. B,
(Respondent B).
61. Id. (Respondent A) (emphasis in original).
62. Response to Question 14, "Is there anything else you would like
with regard to the Pollution Control Agency?" Citizen Survey, App. A,
(Respondent V).
63. Id. (Respondent I).
64. Id. (Respondent T) (emphasis in original).
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Citizens are equally disadvantaged when attempting to present scientific data during agency permit proceedings. Citizens rarely have
the economic or scientific resources to discredit industry or agency
data concerning the health or environmental risks of an activity. As a
result, citizens are unable to generate the scientific resources necessary to successfully challenge scientific data incorporated in agency
rulemaking and permit decisions.
Second, citizen cultural data have minimal impact on agency risk
management decisions. Policy makers hoped that citizen participation would inform agency decision makers about the social and economic ramifications of agency action. Yet, no mechanism exists for
agency staff to utilize citizen cultural data in agency decision making.
Once a project has been approved, state environmental agencies
have little authority to require the regulated party to move the project to another community, or to impose additional pollution abatement measures beyond those required by state regulations.
Realistically, the risk assessment process limits the range of risk management options an agency may consider. As a result, citizen cultural data have little power to influence the outcome of agency
action.
Finally, scientific decision making inhibits the ability of citizens
and agency staff to communicate with each other about risk issues.
For example, in communicating the scientific basis for agency action,
agency staff may depersonalize health risks by emphasizing the statistical probability of harm. Conversely, citizens tend to personalize
statistical risk information to family and friends. As'a result, agency
staff become impatient with citizens who seem unable to understand
the scientific basis for agency action. Citizens in turn become angered at the insensitivity and unfairness of agency decisions that expose family and friends to any increased health risk.
II.

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

A. The Use of Citizen Scientific Data
1. Conclusion
As predicted by the scientific model for agency action, citizens are
at a disadvantage when communicating or providing scientific data to
agency staff. In general, the survey findings indicate that agency staff
are skeptical about the accuracy of citizen scientific data, and only
rarely do citizen data influence the outcome of agency action.
Agency staff were more likely to view industry data as accurate despite the inadequacy of agency resources to test that data.
2.

Results and Analysis

When asked how often health risk information provided by citizens
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affected the final decision in their area, 64% of agency staff responded "occasionally." 6 5 At the same time only 3% of agency staff
believed that citizen scientific data were "usually" valid.66
These findings suggest that agency staff view citizen data with
skepticism. One agency staff member commented, "Issues have become so technical in the health risk assessment area that it is very
unlikely that any citizen ... has the sophistication and expertise to
67
add meaningful data to a discussion."
Agency skepticism of citizen scientific data is especially interesting
when compared to the acceptance rate of industry scientific data.
Over 48% of agency staff believed that industry estimates of health
risk were reasonably accurate. 68 In contrast, only 3% believed the
same for citizen data.69 Yet, 59% of agency staff were skeptical of
the ability of scientists to accurately predict the harm from most
chemicals. 70 Also, 64% of agency staff felt that division resources
were inadequate to independently verify industry test results. 7 1 Several factors may account for the high rejection rate of citizen scientific data over industry data.
Citizens at the local level have limited economic or scientific resources to participate in the collection of risk assessment data for
permit purposes. In addition, citizen scientific data are often
presented during emotionally charged public meetings when community outrage over agency action is high. Agency staff, listening to
citizens voice concerns over agency action, may perceive citizen scientific data as being irrational and therefore less accurate.
It is likely that citizen health risk data are presented too late in the
decision-making process to alter risk assessment methodology. By
the time citizens become involved in agency decisions, the only decision remaining for agency staff is to determine if the project has satisfied all of the applicable regulatory standards.
Another factor is that agency staff have limited legislative authority
or incentive to reopen the risk assessment or rule making process.
One agency member commented, "Often, the first time the public
becomes involved in a project is during environmental review or permitting by the MPCA. Unfortunately, this may be a company's last
65.

Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 6.

66. Id. Ques. 10.
67. Id. Response to Question 19 (Respondent Q).
68. Id. Ques. 12.
69. Id. Ques. 11. Only 6% of citizens, on the other hand, felt that industry provided "reasonably accurate" health risk information. Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques.
5.

70. Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 11.
71. Id. Ques. 9. However, one staff member commented, "Our equipment and
labs are more than adequate, but we don't have enough staff to check all emission or
discharges as often as we should." (Respondent J).
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step in completing a project that has been on the drawing board for
years and for which a lot of money has been expended."72 Thus,
citizen scientific data is presented too late in the decision-making
process, after risk assessment policy and regulations have been
adopted and after agency and industry resources are committed.
Finally, industry data are institutionalized into the scientific decision-making process. Because the agency often has limited economic and human resources to generate independent data for
regulatory purposes, 7s industry becomes the major source of environmental data for agency use in risk assessment, permit applications, and emission monitoring.74
In contrast, citizens are rarely able to generate site specific assessment data. Therefore, citizen scientific data is generally ill-suited for
agency use because it is likely to be in a form not readily adaptable
for use in agency permits. Thus, because industry data is more
adaptable for agency use, agency staff may become dependent on
industry data.
To have an effect on agency decision making, citizens must present
scientific data at the earliest stages of agency decision making and
before formal rules have been adopted.75 Generally, the presentation of valid technical and scientific data occurs too late in the decision-making process, and may be viewed as tainted by cultural
expressions of risks: a perception which further reduces the effectiveness of citizen influence on agency action.
B.

The Use of Citizen Cultural Data
1. Conclusion

According to policy makers, public participation should be most
effective in the risk management stage of agency decision making.
72. Id. Response to Question 19 (Respondent D).
73. See generally PROGRAM EVALUATION Div. OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY 49 (Jan. 1991).

74. For example, Minnesota's regulatory system for water and air pollution relies
on self-monitoring and reporting by permit holders. Consequently the system depends on the accuracy of the results submitted by the permit holders. MPCA staff
"rarely verify the validity of these reports by reviewing companies raw CEM [Continuous Emissions Monitoring] data." Id.
75. Citizens may also have to overcome the agency perception that citizen scientific data is not reliable. One agency respondent commented on the use of citizen
scientific data in agency decisions: "Citizen groups need to get more credible technical (and legal) advice ....Too often these groups are led by 'flakes' who have little
or no technical or health risk basis for their arguments." Agency Survey, App. B,
Ques. 19 (Respondent F).
The majority of citizens agreed with agency staff that citizen groups would be
more effective with the help of scientific experts (95%) and with legal assistance
(80%) in influencing agency decisions. Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 8(8) and 8(3).
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Citizens would inform agency decision makers about the economic,
social, and political ramifications of agency action. The survey findings, however, refute the idea that citizen participation at the risk
management stage of agency decision making has any significant impact on agency action.
Citizens do inform agency decision makers about the political and
cultural impacts of agency action. However, agency staff have little
statutory or regulatory authority to address these issues. Agency
staff prefer to deal with scientific issues, and most indicated that
agency decisions are based upon health risks data.76 One staff member commented, "The staff and board are ill equipped to deal with
the economic and social aspects of permitting decisions." 7 7
In reality, the citizen cultural data in the risk management process
is largely ineffective because the agency is unable to incorporate this
data in its decision making. In contrast, political data, such as equity
in distributing the risks, offered by citizens, are more likely to be
used in the risk management process by the agency.
2.

Results and Analysis

Three cultural components-health, social, and economic-of
risks of a proposed activity on the community were measured in the
survey. Both citizen and agency respondents commented that health
risks should be the most important consideration in agency decision
making. When asked to rate this component, over 98% of citizens78
and 97% of agency staff responded that it was "very important."79
The economic impact on a community was of less concern to
agency staff: only 15% thought it was very important8O in comparison with 44% of citizens surveyed.81 Only 9% of agency stafl82 felt
social impact was very important in contrast to 54% of citizens
surveyed.8 3
The differences between agency and staff responses to cultural risk
measurements are consistent with their use of and reliance on the
scientific decision-making model.84 Agency staff are accustomed to
using scientific data instead of cultural data when making agency decisions. Agency staff, however, are not insensitive to citizen concerns. Rather, when agency staff are faced with the decision to
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 1(6).
Id. Response to Question 19 (Respondent H).
Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 2(1).
Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 8(1).
Id. Ques. 9(b).
Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 2(2).
Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 8(3).
Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 2(3).
See supra text accompanying notes 15 and 19.
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impose "moderate" health risks on a community, 63% of agency
staff favored placing greater emphasis on community concerns in the
decision-making process. 85
The scientific model for agency action tends to inhibit the use of
citizen cultural data in agency decision making because it provides
no formula or theory to quantify citizen data for agency use in decision making. As a result, agency staff may feel frustrated in dealing
with citizen cultural issues which appear unrelated to scientific information. Even though agency staff are sensitive to community social
and economic concerns, they feel constrained to make the final decision based solely upon scientific risk information.
This hypothesis is supported by survey comments. For example,
one MPCA staff member stated, "People do not completely understand what the MPCA has authority to do. That is we must consider a
permit application. If the activity can be conducted without unreasonable risk to public health and the environment, the MPCA must
issue the permit or face a legal challenge." 86 At least one citizen
seemed to recognize this limitation. "Staff are bound by legislative
rules which limit their perview [sic] of issues such as alternatives, exported risk, indirect impacts. Thus, the board issues permits out of
fear of being sued for delaying a permit."8 7 Yet, one citizen related
"feelings of despair, hopelessness, and powerlessness in relation to
decision-making bureaucracies,"88 a common theme among citizens.
The failure of agency decision making to accommodate citizen cultural concerns regarding agency action may contribute to public dissatisfaction with agency decisions. In response to the question of
how well the MPCA was protecting the community from health risks,
over 75% of citizens were dissatisfied with the agency's work.89
85. The question, "Agency staff should place greater emphasis on community
concerns when health risks are moderate," elicited the following response: 63%
agreed, 16% were neutral, 16% disagreed, and 6% strongly disagreed. Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 1(6). Citizens also favored greater decision-making authority
when the health risks were unknown (70%). Citizens Survey, App. A, Ques. 1(3).
Regardless of the economic benefit to the community, citizens thought agency staff
should reject activities if there are moderate risks to public health (88%). Id. Ques.
1(5).
86. Response to Question 19, "Is there anything else you would like to tell us
with regard to the Pollution Control Agency?" Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 19
(Respondent I) (emphasis in original).
87. Response to Question 13, "What do you see as barriers to effective public
participation in the decision-making process on environmental issues?" Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 13 (Respondent S).
88. Id. (Respondent U).
89. Id. Ques. 1(2). Citizens were equally dissatisfied (70%) with the job local
government was doing in protecting the community from health risks. Id. Ques. 1(8).
The majority of citizens felt that they should be more involved in the collection of
health risk information (86%), id. Ques. 8(4), and that the agency should collect
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Furthermore, citizen dissatisfaction with agency action may relate,
in part, to the perception that the agency's primary function is to
prevent, not merely to reduce, the production of pollutants. The
overwhelming majority of citizens (90%) believe that the mission of
the MPCA is to prevent the release of potentially harmful substances
into the environment. 90 One citizen stated that the agency should be
renamed the "Pollution Prevention Agency." 91 In contrast, only 42%
of agency staff agreed with the majority of citizens that the MPCA
mission is prevention.92 One staff member said, "The Pollution
Control Agency is just that . . . not the Pollution Elimination
Agency." 93 These sentiments reflect a basic conflict over the mission
of the MPCA and may contribute to citizen dissatisfaction with
agency action.
C.

Communication
1.

Conclusion

Public meetings are the principal means by which agency staff
gather data about citizen concerns over a proposed activity. Yet,
many studies have confirmed the limited value of public meetings in
influencing agency action.94 In general, citizens and agency staff expressed difficulty talking with one another about scientific and cultural risk issues. Results from the author's survey support these
conclusions.
The majority of citizens felt that agency meetings were the best
way to inform agency decision makers. 9 5 Only a fraction of those
more information about health risks in their community (71%). Id. Ques. 1(6). Citizens were also worried about agency "capture" by business interests. Seventy-three
percent felt that the MPCA "favored business interests over community concerns."
Id. Ques. 1(4).
90. Id. Ques. 1(1).
91. Response to Question 14, "Is there anything else you would like to tell us
with regard to the Pollution Control Agency?" Id. Ques. 14 (Respondent W) (emphasis in original).
92. Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 1(3).
93. Response to Question 19, "Is there anything else you would like to tell us
with regard to the Pollution Control Agency?" Id. Ques. 19 (Respondent C).
94. See, e.g., Cramton, The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participationin

the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. LJ. 525 (1972). Citizens who attend agency meetings may reflect complex and diverse interests. As such, no single or absolute public
interest exists. The task of "divining" which public interest or blending of interests
to apply in the decision-making process presents a significant challenge to agency
resources. Administrative agencies often blend and balance the competing viewpoints resulting in "a decision reflecting the agency's response to its political necessities-its insider perspective about the public interest." Murphy & Hoffman, supra
note 19, at 394 (quoting SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 61 (1970)) (emphasis in
original).
95. Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 8(1) (84%).
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same citizens, however, thought that public meetings actually influenced the outcome of agency action.96 In contrast, the majority of
agency staff believed that public meetings had a "significant" impact
on decision making in their area. 9 7 At the same time, many agency
staff believed that public meetings failed to reduce community concerns over agency decisions.98
One possible explanation for the discrepancy in opinions over the
usefulness of agency meetings is that citizens and agency staff may
use public meetings to achieve different goals. For citizens, public
meetings may be the only forum for the expression of cultural concerns. At the same time, citizen cultural concerns are almost never
resolved at public meetings. This fact contributes to the perception
that citizen participation in agency meetings rarely influences agency
action.
Similarly, the inability of agency staff to satisfy cultural concerns
may have contributed to the perception of agency staff that public
meetings are not useful in reducing community concern about
agency action. On the other hand, public meetings have some positive influence on agency decision makers. Because agency staff must
respond to citizen comments about agency action, the input from
public meetings can significantly expand the range and scope of environmental review. In this way, citizen participation is successful in
informing agency decisions.
2.

Results and Analysis

Citizens were positive about the use of public meetings to educate
the agency about community concerns (84%).99 Yet, many were
skeptical of the ability of public meetings to influence agency decision making (60%).100
There may be several reasons for citizen frustration over agency
96. Id. Ques. 8(2) (23%).
97. The survey examined agency staff perceptions that public informational
meetings and board meetings contribute significantly to MPCA decision making. See
Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 7 and 4.
98. Id. Ques. 13(1) (47%).
99. Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 8(1).
100. Id. Ques. 13. One citizen voiced a common response regarding the effect
public meetings have on agency decisions: "The MPCA seems to be uninterested in
public participation. They do not see the public as a group to turn to for input, but
rather as something they have to tolerate before deciding things the way they had
previously decided." (Respondent V).
Another participant added this observation: "We are not able to sit down at a
table with industry and the PCA and have an open discussion. Instead we drive 120
miles, take a day off work from our jobs, pay large babysitting fees and have the PCA
tell us we have 15 minutes total to talk." (Respondent X) (emphasis in original).
Responses to Question 13, "What do you see as barriers to effective public participation in the decision making process on environmental issues?" Id. Ques. 13.
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meetings. Citizens may view agency meetings as a way to negotiate
for their preferred outcome. Agency staff, however, have little authority to deal with these issues. When it becomes clear that agency
staff are unable to accommodate citizen cultural concerns over
agency action, citizens feel powerless to change the decision-making
process.
Agency staff were divided on the usefulness of agency meetings in
collecting citizen environmental concerns. 0 1 However, the majority
of agency staff believed that information obtained from board meetings (62%) and public informational meetings (67%) was a "significant factor in PCA decision making."102 At the same time, 47% of
agency staff agreed that public meetings did little to allay community
concern over agency decisions.103
One potential area for citizen and agency communication
problems is in the area of health risk communication. One assumption often made by agency staff is that citizens are unable to understand the scientific basis for agency action and, as a result, agency
staff are unable to satisfy citizen concerns. The majority of agency
staff (88%) believed that the agency risk assessment process was not
well understood by the public. 0 4
In reality, however, agency staff may be attempting to communicate the scientific basis for agency action while citizens are attempting to communicate cultural concerns about agency action. This
conclusion is supported by exploring agency and citizen responses to
risks. Both agency staff and citizens were asked to rank the perception of risks to the following statement: If 100,000 people are exposed to an environmental activity for their lifetime, and this
exposure results in one additional case of cancer, then this activity is:
high, moderate or low risk. Agency staff perceived this risk measure101. Agency staff were almost evenly split on the statement that open public meetings are the best way to collect information about community environment concerns.
While 38% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 41% disagreed or strongly
disagreed. Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 13(2).
102. Id. Ques. 7(c) and 3(c).
103. Id. Ques. 13(1). As agency staff noted, public meetings may do little to allay
community concern over agency action because citizens and agency staff have different goals and communication styles. One agency member commented: "If there are
truly environmental concerns or risks associated with a project, that is relatively easy
for the MPCA to address. However, many times the public may be concerned about
a project for other reasons, such as siting, economics or politics and use illogical and
emotional environmental concerns to stop the project. The MPCA cannot satisfy or
reason with these citizens." Response to Question 19, "Is there anything else you
would like to tell us with regard to the Pollution Control Agency?" Id. Ques. 19
(Respondent D) (emphasis in original).
This Comment supports the notion that risk communication issues are an important factor in influencing the opinions of agency and citizen participants.
104. Id. Ques. 13(3).
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ment to be: high (13%), moderate (25%) and low (61%).105 Citizens

perceived this risk measurement to be: high (41%), moderate (20%),
1
and low (39%). 06

The results are significant for two reasons. First, the percentage of
citizens ranking the risk as high may reflect a blending of cultural
and technical risks information. One citizen noted "1:100,000
sounds like low risk, but even one additional case is too much."1 0 7
Citizen responses indicate a high degree of concern about any environmental or health risk, however minimal. It may be difficult for
agency staff, many of whom are scientists, to accept citizens' concern
about activities that present a scientifically low risk.108 Other researchers of environmental risks communication note that community perceptions of risks may have little to do with scientifically
determined risk.109 This raises an important question of how effectively agency staff can communicate scientific perceptions of risks
when citizens are concerned about cultural perceptions of risks.
A second reason is that a significant portion of the public agreed
with agency staff that a 1:100,000 ratio of health risks represents a
low risk. This finding suggests that the public can and does understand the use of scientific criteria for describing the potential for
health risks from an activity. Agency staff may be discounting the
ability of the public to understand risk issues, confusing cultural responses to risks with the failure to understand scientific concepts
about risks. 10

The perception by agency staff that citizens use health risks data as
a "smoke screen to oppose an activity that has minimal environmental impacts"1II may lead agency staff to reject valid scientific arguments presented by citizens and focus instead on the expression of
cultural risks. Consequently, the inability of staff to deal with cultural risk issues in the decision-making process creates barriers to
communication between citizens and agency staff.
105. Id. Ques. 7.
106. Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 3.
107. Id. (Respondent M).
108. One staff member commented: "[The public's] scope is narrow and they do
not question carefully how they expose themselves to other pollutants in their life,
either voluntarily or involuntarily." Agency Survey, App. B, Ques. 19 (Respondent

G).
109. See, e.g., EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 15, at 21-22.
110. One agency staff member commented: "While most citizens are genuinely
concerned with the health risks of subject facilities, it is often difficult and frustrating
for staff to deal with those hidden economic or social agendas." Agency Survey, App.
B, Ques. 19 (Respondent H).
111. Id. (Respondent B).
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Conclusion

In sum, the use of a scientific decision-making model presents a
significant barrier to effective public participation. It is unlikely that
the public will acquiesce to agency authority to regulate environmental issues, or that agency decision makers will abandon the scientific
decision-making model for agency action. Thus, policy makers, legislators, and agency staff must find alternative means to incorporate
citizen concerns in agency decision making.
PART III
Since the first major public participation legislation, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), was passed in 1946, public involvement
in agency decision making has centered around three core participatory models: public meetings, notice and comment rule-making, and adjudication.112
In the increasingly complex area of environmental regulation, citizens confined to the use of traditional citizen participation models
are at a serious disadvantage in influencing agency decision makers.
Citizens affected by agency action often bring scientific information
too late in the decision-making process to influence agency decisions. Public meetings are often scheduled too late in the decisionmaking process for citizens to influence risk assessment regulations.
In addition, rule making and adjudication procedures are likely to
involve scientific and legal issues, requiring citizens to hire scientists
and lawyers to effectively challenge agency regulations.11
Even
when citizens have the economic resources to challenge agency regulations, courts generally defer to agency expertise. The courts grant
limited review to determine only whether agency action was within
its authority or whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
Alternative models for public participation have been proposed:
citizen panels,14 lobbying groups," 15 and risk communication plans
112. See Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359,
369-72 (1972); Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 19, at 396-99.
113. See Berry, supra note 38, at 472-73. "[I]t is an irrational allocation of resources for most citizen groups to extend any significant effort toward reforming
existing citizen participation programs." Id. at 467 (emphasis deleted). More emphasis should be placed on legislative lobbying and agency policy making. First, citizens should identify and cultivate allies in the bureaucracy with which they primarily
deal. Second, citizens should become a reliable and valuable source of information
for bureaucrats in the agency. Third, citizens should prove to officials that their
active opposition to agency policy can be politically damaging. Id. at 472-74.
114. Crosby, Kelly & Schaefer, supra note 5, at 171. These authors propose the
utilization of randomly chosen citizen panels who are informed on a topic, to recommend policy options to agencies. The central purpose of this participatory model is
to overcome the perceived defects in existing participation schemes. For example,
there is no standard for selecting citizens in most participation models and anyone
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to educate agency staff about cultural risk concerns. 1 6 Most of these
proposals are designed to improve the communication process between citizens and agency staff. These proposals do not, however,
dissipate the chilling effects that the use of a scientific decision-making model has on citizen participation.
In the present scheme of regulatory relationships, the agency and
project proposer negotiate over regulatory costs of a proposed activity. 117 This paper proposes that citizens participate in those negotiations. To be effective, a public participation model must restore the
balance of inputs of a free market relationship; citizens, agency decision makers, and the regulated party must be allowed to negotiate
for a preferred outcome.
The regulator and regulated share a mutual interest in bargained
accommodation because resorting to legal or political action is costly
who wants to participate is allowed to participate. If large groups take advantage of

this right to participate, it becomes difficult for agency staff to communicate and ascertain which viewpoint predominates. If small groups take advantage, then the question is raised as to whom the groups represent. The authors propose that random
selection procedures based upon public opinion polls would effectively represent the
viewpoints of those affected by the agency action. This participation model is aimed
at providing a balanced public input for agency decision making and would be most
useful in issues of a non-technical nature. However, a shared scientific and citizen
panel may be helpful in dealing with complex technical issues.
115. Berry, supra note 38, at 463. As previously mentioned, Professor Berry argues that it would be a waste of resources for citizen groups to extend any significant
effort toward reforming existing participation programs. Id. at 467. While existing
public participation programs have created a right to participate which is a useful
step toward a right to consult and even a possible right to share power, whatever
influence can ultimately be derived from these programs can be gained through the
current programs. Conventional lobbying would allow citizen groups to acquire
more power to influence agency action. However, this notion of increasing citizen
effectiveness is aimed at legislative and institutionalized practices and offers little
assistance to citizens at the local level of agency action.
116. See generally Stenzel, The Needfor a NationalRisk Assessment Communication Policy,

11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 381 (1987). Miscommunication of risks or lack of communication is costly: the public distrusts regulatory agencies and does not readily accept
their decisions. When the public contests or does not respect regulatory decisions,
administrative agencies operate inefficiently. The law should require administrative
agencies to share risk information with the public in a meaningful, consistent manner. Stenzel argues that this would have two beneficial effects. First, the public
would begin to realize that there is no such thing as absolute safety in life, and would
therefore, learn to tolerate risks. Second, the public would learn to distinguish between those risks which warrant investment of limited social resources from those
which they must simply tolerate. This approach may have some positive effects on
citizen and agency interaction over cultural responses to risk. Id.
117. See Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,

1805-13 (1975). These costs consist not only of the direct compliance expenditures
required of regulated firms, but the indirect effects of regulatory burdens and constraints on investment, innovation, productivity growth, and the international competitiveness of the United States economy.
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to both sides.'18 Citizens, however, rarely have an opportunity to
negotiate for their preferred outcome. Citizen participation at the
earliest stages of environmental intervention would encourage citizens to seek the same kind of informal accommodations.
Citizens can bring at least four sources of power to the negotiation
process. First, citizens have direct access to the local political process in which the regulated party wishes to locate an activity. Second, citizens have media access and can use that power to shape
public opinion about the project, thereby gaining valuable support
to fight for their preferred outcome.' 1 9 Third, citizens can delay
projects through official regulatory channels, such as adjudicatory
proceedings and public hearing procedures.20 Finally, citizens can
21
resort to the courts.
I.

THE BENEFITS OF EARLY CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Requiring the agency to involve citizens in the early phase of the
regulatory process could ameliorate the impact of the use of scientific decision making on citizen participation. First, early citizen negotiations with industry would encourage the assimilation of citizens'
concerns in the decision-making process. The regulated party can
respond to economic or social concerns about a proposed project.
Industry can negotiate with the community for economic incentives
to proceed with the project or it can set aside funds for future monitoring costs of the site.
Industry would be forced to deal with the externalities problem
when faced with citizen demands for pollution abatement proposals.122 Externalities exist whenever a regulated party makes a decision about how to use resources without taking into account the
effects-costs or benefits-of the decision. Because the effects fall
on others, the regulated party can choose to ignore them. In the
environmental regulatory context, requiring business to negotiate
directly with citizens would force the regulated business to take into
account the social costs of imposing health or environmental risks on
the community.123
118. Stewart, supra note 21, at 659-60.
119. The media can be a powerful tool for focusing attention on environmental
issues and activating state political involvement in local issues. See KRIMSKY &
PLOUGH, supra note 6, at 63-64.
120. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as ProsecutorModel of Environmental Enforcement
Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA.
L. REV. 337, 337-40 (1988).

121. Id.
122.

Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON, REV. 347, 347-57

(1967).
123. See generally id.
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Early citizen participation could reduce citizen concerns over cultural risks issues and improve communication between citizens and
agency staff. Citizens could become familiar with the possible health
and environmental risks of an activity, thereby lessening anxiety over
unknown or unfamiliar risks. Furthermore, citizens could acquire
control over involuntary risks by obtaining concessions from industry and agency decision makers early in the regulatory process.
Finally, citizens could influence the outcome of agency action by
negotiating directly with the regulated party. Citizens are often outraged when they learn that they are the last in a long chain of governmental and private actors to learn of a proposed project. The
early involvement of citizens affected by a project could reduce delay
tactics on the part of citizen and community groups. Citizen access
at the earliest possible point could encourage community groups to
participate in the planning phases of a project, enhancing the perception of shared decision-making power with agencies and

industry. 124
A.

Early Public ParticipationPrograms

The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Actl25 is the
most sophisticated statute adopting an early citizen participation
program. Generally, a developer proposing to construct, maintain,
and operate a hazardous waste facility must obtain a siting agreement with the community before the facility can be constructed.126
The Massachusetts Act sets out five criteria in order to construct
and operate a hazardous waste facility. First, the required licenses,
permits, and siting agreement must be obtained.127 Second, before
the local community can exclude a hazardous waste facility, it must
show that the facility poses special risks to the community.128 Third,
the community is encouraged to participate in the selection of sites
124. Fiorino, supra note 4, at 534. Research on public attitudes towards siting of
hazardous waste facilities suggests a positive link between support for siting decisions, information about institutional controls, and the opportunity to influence siting decisions and control measures. A proposal having the greatest effect on
attitudes was one allowing local public officials and citizens to conduct regular safety
inspections. Id. at 533-34.
125. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D (West Supp. 1981). The constitutionality of
the Act has been upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Town of Warren v.
Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 392 Mass. 107, 110, 466 N.E.2d 102,
105 (1984). See also Cronin & Fieldsteel, When Does Environmental Regulation of Private
Property Become a Taking and Require Compensation?, 70 MAss. L. REV. 72 (1985) (discussing general trend of Massachusetts courts to uphold Massachusetts Environmental
Laws against constitutional challenges).
126. Id. ch. 21D, § 12.
127. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40A, § 9 (West Supp. 1991).
128. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D, § 11 (West Supp. 1981). The grants are
provided by waste facility councils which are appointed by the governor. Id. § 4.
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for a proposed facility through the availability of technical assistance
grants.' 29 Fourth, developers and communities must agree to binding arbitration if an agreement cannot be reached.130 Finally, compensation must be provided for neighboring communities likely to
be affected by the hazardous waste facility.131
The Massachusetts approach encourages public participation. The
Massachusetts Act creates an incentive for the developer to negotiate
with communities over siting and enforcement issues. For example,
regulated parties can no longer rely on formal participation requirements to shelter them from public outrage over agency action.
Presently, many citizens have no formal means to negotiate directly with the regulated party, and often resort to the political or
legal process to stop the proposed activity. While delaying tactics
are one cost that may be reduced by early citizen participation, the
uncertainty of citizen demands may create additional problems, such
as increased potential for litigation.132 However, mandating citizen
involvement in the beginning phase of the regulatory relationship
would shift litigation costs to that phase of a project, thereby decreasing total litigation costs.'

33

In addition, the incentive approach assumes that compensation for
all costs can render an individual neutral toward a hazardous facil-

ity.' 34 The idea that communities can bargain away the health and

safely of their friends and family may be morally repugnant to
many.135 Indeed, offers of compensation may increase opposition to
a proposed activity. Consequently, a pure compensation model may
be objectionable to many communities.
A modified compensation model may be more acceptable to citizens. A statutory scheme could be set up in which communities
would be given a range of environmental controls in addition to
those established by existing regulations. The community and regu129. Id. ch. 21D, § 11.
130. Id. ch. 21D, § 14.
131. Id.
132. Stewart, supra note 21, at 677-78.
133. See, e.g., Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council,
392 Mass. 107, 466 N.E.2d 102 (1984).
134. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 6, at 276.
135. Id. at 276-77. Bacow identifies three reasons why the costs of hazardous
waste facilities may not be readily compensated by incentive programs:
First, consumers do not always conduct the rational risk-benefit analysis that
is attributed to them by economists. ...
Second, many people object to the concept of putting a price on health
or environmental amenities. ...
Third, even if social costs are compensable at the individual level, it
may not be possible to reach a community consensus on the appropriate
form or amount of compensation.... [In addition,] developers have little
incentive to negotiate unless agreements can curb opposition.
Id. at 277.
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lated party could negotiate for the most appropriate set of additional
regulatory costs. For example, cultural risk research suggests that
community control over the regulated site can reduce opposition to
the activity.136 Thus, the community could require the project pro-

poser to conduct additional environmental testing with the supervision of community representatives. Any violations by the project
proposer could be subject to sanctions, with the community the direct recipient of the funds. As a result, the regulated party would
have a direct financial incentive in maintaining strict emission or pollution control measures.
In addition, the siting agreement could shift some of the regulatory compliance costs to the private sector. In a recent report to the
Minnesota State Legislature, several deficiencies were noted in
MPCA environmental programs.' 3 7 For example, the report noted
that the MPCA needs to collect more information on risk assessment
issues, improve enforcement of regulations, and impose more fines
for repeat violators.138 Citizens operating under the authority of a
siting agreement could collect additional risk assessment data or require the project proposer to conduct more frequent emission testing. Citizens responding to the author's survey indicated a strong
interest in compliance issues, and a desire to assist in the enforcement of pollution control measures.' 3 9 Thus, direct involvement by
citizens in environmental monitoring could expand the agency's resources to deal with environmental issues.
Furthermore, a limited range of additional environmental controls
could promote a negotiated agreement between citizens and the project proposer. First, the incentive for the project proposer to agree
136. EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 15, at 213. See also Portney, The
Potential of the Theory of Compensationfor Mitigating Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste
Treatment Facility Siting: Some Evidence from Five Massachusetts Communities, 14 POL'Y
STUDIES J. 81, 85-87 (1985). In a study of the Massachusetts approach, Portney
found that 43.9% of those who opposed the siting of a facility in their community
changed their mind under one of eleven proposals. The proposal which elicited the
highest percentage change of opinion advocated regular safety inspections of the facility by citizens and community representatives. In each of the five communities
studied, economic proposals such as the payment of all property taxes for ten years,
improved fire protection, paying each resident the decreased property value, or paying a surcharge to the community for the amount of waste processed, varied depending on the particular interests of the community.
137. See PROGRAM EVALUATION MPCA, supra note 73.
138. Id. at 59-60.
139. The majority of citizens (86%) believed that they should be more involved in
the collection of health risk information, Citizen Survey, App. A, Ques. 12, and in the
enforcement of industry permits (85%), id. Ques. 14.
The Agency Staff Survey showed that 47% of the staff agreed that citizens should
be involved in enforcement issues while 29% opposed citizen involvement. Agency
Survey, App. B, Ques. 13.
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to additional environmental controls would be the limited nature of
additional regulatory burdens, and some guarantee that citizen opposition would be lessened. Second, the limited scope of additional
environmental controls could reduce the tendency for communities.
and the regulated party to undertake litigation in order to reduce
uncertainty.i40 Finally, for communities, additional environmental
controls, including economic compensation plans, could accommodate concerns about the additional environmental risks and social
costs of the proposed activity.
The range of additional regulatory burdens on the developer
could be determined according to several factors, such as the type of
project proposed, or the potential for increased health or environmental risks. In setting up a graduated scale, cultural risk data could
be used, in addition to existing risk assessment data, to identify those
variables creating a perception of enhanced risks by individuals.
On the other hand, mandating that the developer negotiate with
citizens before a project is constructed may create concerns. First,
small projects may not have the economic resources to accommodate
citizen concerns over the activity. For example, citizens may demand
the application of expensive pollution abatement technology not currently required by state or federal law. The cost may be burdensome
for small businesses. In addition, some projects may be funded by
municipalities or other governmental bodies. Citizen demands may
create additional financial burdens on already limited budgets.
Despite these concerns, early citizen participation in environmental decision making is the most promising solution to the social, economic, and scientific barriers citizens face in influencing agency
decision makers. Policy makers, by adopting an approach mandating
the early involvement of citizens in environmental decision making,
would address citizen concerns over agency action and would
achieve the goals of participatory democracy.
The need for new sites for hazardous waste treatment and disposal
facilities is likely to increase in the future.141 In order to satisfy the
demand, policy makers must find a way to accommodate community
concerns in the decision-making process or face increasingly hostile
citizen reaction to the siting of a proposed activity. To address these
concerns, Minnesota should adopt a modified hazardous waste siting
140. Stewart, supra note 21, at 664. The rise of social regulations and the creation
of public interest law have changed the predominant pattern of regulatory relationships. There has been increased litigation as a result of expanding the scope of regulation to include third party interests. Uncertainty leading to litigation is especially
great at the onset of changing economic or social conditions. During such periods
the regulated or regulators resort to litigation in an effort to redefine the law in a way
favorable to their interests. Id.
141. See generally Portney, supra note 136.
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plan, with limited environmental controls, and unlimited compensation plans to encourage the assimilation of cultural and political concerns in environmental decision making.
B.

Early Citizen ParticipationProgram in Minnesota

Adopting an early citizen participation program, similar to the
Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, would enhance
the ability of project proposers to site facilities and give the community some control over the development and regulatory compliance
of the facility. Past efforts to site undesirable activities in Minnesota
have led to extensive public opposition, and even to withdrawal of
project proposals.142
1.

History of the Minnesota Waste Management Act)

In 1980 the Minnesota Legislature enacted the Waste Management Act (Act) 143 with provisions for a Hazardous Waste Management Board (Board). The Board was granted broad powers to
evaluate, site, and operate hazardous waste facilities in any county in
the state. 14 4 Under the provisions of the Act the decisions of the
Board are "final and shall supersede and preempt requirements of
state agencies and political subdivisions" and "no charter provision,
ordinance, rule, permit, or other requirement of any state agency or
political subdivision" shall restrict the development and siting of a
hazardous waste facility.145 In sum, the Act preempts any local efforts to restrict the siting of hazardous waste facilities.
In 1984, before any site was selected under the Act, public opposition prompted the legislature to amend the preemptive requirements.' 4 6 "The volunteer process may not work, but what we have
been doing has not worked ....

Once their guard is dropped and

people don't feel something is going to be forced on them, reason
starts to prevail."'4 7 The Board was ordered to terminate all activities relating to the selection and evaluation of sites for hazardous
waste facilities,148 and to dismiss any sites under consideration. 149
However, the preemptive elements of the Act have never been re142. The local community strongly opposed a plan to reopen and enlarge a landfill in Eden Prairie, Minnesota. After four years, the developer abandoned the project. At one public meeting alone, nearly 500 "boisterous" community residents
voiced concern over the landfill. St. Paul Pioneer Press, June 26, 1990, at 4B, col. 1.
143. MINN. STAT. § 115A (1990).
144. Id. § 115A.08.
145. Id. § 115A.28, subd. 2.
146. Mpls. Star & Tribune, Mar. 6, 1986, at lB, col. 7.
147. Quotation of Bill Walker, chair of the Waste Management Board, in reference to the adoption of a voluntary siting process. Id.
148. MINN. STAT. § 115A.175, subd. 1 (1990).
149. Id. § 115A.175, subd. 2.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss4/5

34

Bray: Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen Participation in
1991]

ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY DECISIONMAKING

1145

pealed by the legislaturel50 and could be reactivated if the voluntary
siting amendments to the Act fail.
2.

The Voluntary Hazardous Waste Siting Act

In 1986 the original, Act was amended to provide for a voluntary
selection process' 5 ' with economic incentives for any community
willing to consider the development of a hazardous waste stabilization and containment facility.152 It is important to note, however,
that the amended Act applies only to state owned and operated hazardous waste stabilization and containment facilities.153 Thus, private hazardous waste developers may contract for the siting and
operation of a hazardous waste facility, landfill, incinerator or other
development in Minnesota without complying with the requirements
of the Siting Act.
Once the county board has passed a resolution of interest,' 5 4 the
county is eligible for $6,000 per month in additional local government aid from the state, subject to certain limitations.155 If a county
decides to accept a facility, state aid may not exceed $600,000 in any
56
fiscal year. '
After a county decides to enter into a binding contract for the development of a facility, the local political subdivision may impose
reasonable requirements respecting the construction, inspection, operation, monitoring, and maintenance of a facility, subject to the ap150. Id. § 115A.28, subd. 2.
151. Ifa county board negotiates, offers, or enters into a contract with the Hazardous Waste Board, the county must submit the question of whether to proceed with
the contract to a vote of that county's eligible voters. See MINN. STAT. § 115A. 191,

subd. 6 (1990).
152. Any eligible county may enter into a contract with the Waste Management
Board "expressing their voluntary and mutually satisfactory agreement concerning
the location and development of a stabilization and containment facility." MINN.
STAT. § 115A. 191, subd. 1 (1990). After executing the contract, the county will receive various benefits including, but not limited to, "compensation for demonstrable
private and community impacts from the facility," and "provision of services or benefits to promote the health, safety, comfort, and economic development and well-being of the county and its citizens .... " Id. § 1 15A.191, subd. 5(c).
153. See id. § 115A.195. The central purpose of a waste stabilization and containment facility is to apply a chemical or thermal process to metal contaminated inorganic wastes, such as ash and scrubber sludge from hazardous waste incinerators, in
order to render the wastes less toxic and minimize the leaching of metals once the
ash is disposed of in landfills. See MINN. WASTE MGMT. BD., STABILIZATION AND CONTAINMENT REPORT ON FACILITY DEVELOPMENT 3 (June 30, 1988) (Revised Draft).

154. MINN. STAT. § 115A.191, subd. 2 (1990). A resolution of interest means that
the county has expressed an interest in being a location for a stabilization and containment facility.
155. Id. § 477A.012, subd. 2(a). The state has an overall cap of $40,000 per
month for all the counties.
156. Id. § 477A.012, subd. 2(b).
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proval of those terms by the Board and other permitting agencies. 157
The Board retains the final authority to "approve, disapprove, suspend, modify, or reverse" any local requirements.158 Since the Act
was amended, thirteen counties have passed resolutions of interest.
Each of the thirteen county boards expressed their interest in negotiations and their willingness to accept the preliminary evaluation of
one or more study areas in their county. The resolutions, unlike the
contract provisions of the Act, allow the county to withdraw the resolution of interest at any time. To date all thirteen counties have rejected the siting of a facility in their community.159
Community response to the Minnesota Siting Act is not surprising.
The Minnesota Act fails to address one of the most important cultural risk determinants: the ability of citizens to control the imposition of health and environmental risks. Under the Act, local citizens
are being asked to bear the social and health risks costs of a facility
with virtually no control over the negotiation process or management of the facility.160 Unlike the Massachusetts Act, the principal
players in the Minnesota Siting Act are the county board and the
Waste Management Board.161 In a national survey of hazardous
waste siting programs, 6 2 the most successful siting programs allowed citizens to negotiate for the most appropriate set of health and
environmental controls.163
3.

Citizen ParticipationRequirements

Under the Minnesota Siting Act, citizen participation is limited to
157. Id. § 1 15A.28, subd. 3; see also id. § 115A.191, subd. 5.
158. Id. § 115A.28, subd. 3.
159. Telephone interview with Bruce Brasaemle, staff, Office of Waste Management (formally Board of Waste Management) (Mar. 4, 1991). Under the Minnesota
Siting Act, a resolution of interest signifies a county interest in negotiations and its
willingness to accept the preliminary evaluation of one or more study areas in the
county. MINN. STAT. § 1 15A.191, subd. 2 (1990). A resolution of interest, however,
may be withdrawn at any time before the parties execute a contract. Id.
160. Local citizen participation contemplated under the Act is limited to the site
selection process. Minnesota Statute section 115A.22 provides for the foundation of
local project review committees consisting of parties with direct interests in the outcome of candidate site reviews and whose members are appointed by the governor.
The committee's duties range from feasibility analysis to informing local citizens of
the proposed project to developing a consensus of local attitudes for purposes of
reporting to the Office of Waste Management. See id. § 115A.22, subd. 5.
161. Id. § 115A.191, subd. 1. "The office of waste management and any eligible
county board may enter a contract as provided in this section expressing their voluntary and mutually satisfactory agreement concerning the location and development
of a stabilization and containment facility." Id.
162. LEGIS. COMM'N ON Toxic SUBSTANCES & HAZARDOUS WASTES, HAZARDOUS
WASTE FACILITY SITING: A NATIONAL SURVEY (June 1987).
163. Id. at 21 (noting that extensive public participation programs appear to promote siting activity).
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public hearings and meetings.164 For example, the Act provides for
citizen participation during the permitting and environmental review
process.' 6 5 As noted above these participation mechanisms are
rarely successful in mitigating cultural risk concerns.
The Act provides for the establishment of local committees, but
committee members are selected by the governor and are not authorized by the statute to participate in contract negotiations with
the state or project developer.166 In addition, the county board is
encouraged to provide "affected political subdivisions and other in-

16 7
terested persons with an opportunity to suggest contract terms."'

Citizens may find it difficult to trust the county board, a governmental actor with a direct financial incentive in the outcome of the siting
process. However, the statute is silent with regard to the establishment of an independent citizen panel for the representation of community residents.
4.

Lack of Cultural Incentives

If a county agrees to accept a hazardous waste facility, the Act provides for additional financial incentives.168 The incentives are aimed
primarily at compensating the county for the perceived social and
economic costs of the facility, such as decreased property values.
While these provisions are useful, they fail to address cultural risks
concerns, such as citizen control over the operation of the facility.
Economic aid packages and other incentives do little to improve
community acceptance of a hazardous waste facility, and may even
increase opposition. 169

The Act allows the local political subdivision to request additional
controls over the facility, such as maintenance and operation requirements.170 However, the Board retains final decision-making
power over additional controls,]7, and citizens have no independent
power to negotiate directly with the state or developer. Because citizens rarely trust governmental authorities to act in their best interests, the Act should provide for the creation of independent citizen
164. See MINN. STAT.
165. Id. § 115A.35.

§ 115A.22, subd. 7 (1990).

166. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
167.

MINN. STAT. § 115A.191, subd. 1 (1990).

168. For example, a contract between the state and the county may provide "compensation for local public expenditures necessitated by the facility; ... demonstrable
private and community impacts from the facility... [and] the provision of services or
benefits to promote the health, safety, comfort, and economic development and wellbeing of the county and its citizens .... Id. § 115A.191, subd. 5(c).
169. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
170. See MINN. STAT. § 115A.28, subd. 3 (1990).
171. Id. ("The [Board] may approve, disapprove, suspend, modify, or reverse any
such requirements. The decision of the office or agency shall be final.").
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panels with power to require additional testing, monitoring, and
other cultural risk reduction incentives.
Moreover, the Act should provide financial assistance to the community for the purposes of hiring scientific experts to assist the community in the selection of appropriate health and environmental
controls. State funding assures that hazardous waste facilities are
not "dumped on poorer communities unable to mobilize the resources, both financial and scientific" to participate in the negotiation process. 172

5.

Uncertain Enforcement of Risks Controls Under the Act
The Act is not explicit regarding what enforcement authority the
county or community would have against the facility developer. A
facility "may be wholly owned by the state or jointly owned by the
state and a developer selected by the [Board]."17 The Act is clear,
however, that "[n]o civil action shall be maintained ...with respect
to conduct taken by a person pursuant to any environmental quality
standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement or
permit issued by the office [of Waste Management]." 174 Because
pursuing civil remedies against the state or developer is not an option, citizens are more likely to be reluctant to agree to the siting of a
facility in their community. In contrast, the Massachusetts Siting Act
provides explicit statutory authority for citizens to enforce contract
terms against the developer.'75
6. Economic Viability of a State-Operated Facility
If the Act is applied only to state-operated facilities, the competitiveness and therefore the economic viability of the facility may be in
doubt. One state, Maryland, operated a facility on a state-owned
site. Because it did not have a monopoly, it could not compete with
the cheaper facilities of neighboring states.' 7 6 Even states that have
identified environmentally safe locations for the development of a
facility have discovered that the sites may not be "economically attractive to private enterprise operators." 7 7 The need to compete
172. Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 51, 70 (1989).
173. MINN. STAT. § 115A.195 (1990).
174. Id. § 1 15A.30. The statute precludes civil actions concerning acts taken pur-

suant to Minnesota Statute sections 115A. 18-.30. These sections include but are not
limited to final decisions of the board, participation by affected localities, and any
local requirements imposed by political subdivisions.
175. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D (1990 & West Supp. 1991).
176. Andrews & Pierson, Local Control or State Override: Experiences and Lessons to
Date, 14 POL'Y STUD. J. 90, 94 (1985).

177. Id. In order to compete effectively, some states which own and operate a
waste facility or landfill, tax the disposal of hazardous waste imported from other
states at rates higher than waste generated in-state. Under the "market participation
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effectively in the waste disposal market has important implications
for community acceptance of a waste facility. It may become necessary for a state-operated facility to accept waste from a large area in
order to stay economically viable.
A Minnesota hazardous waste facility would have to import an average of 20,000 tons annually over the 20 year life of the facility to
make the project economically viable.' 7 8 The importation of waste
generated outside the state may increase opposition to the facility
and bring into question the ability of a state-owned facility to operate
efficiently.
Because of the increased costs connected with the government operation of a waste facility, it may be more efficient and cost effective
to allow citizens to negotiate directly with a private project proposer.
The more control citizens have in the negotiation process, the less
citizens feel the need to use delaying tactics or to resort to the political process to stop the project. Minnesota has spent over ten years
and an inordinate amount of economic and human resources trying
to site just one hazardous waste facility.
CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Hazardous Waste Siting Act offers citizens one of
two choices. They can present their views in traditional public participation procedures with an opportunity to "suggest" contract
terms. Or they can fight the siting of a hazardous waste facility in
their community. As is evident from the thirteen communities which
have withdrawn resolutions of interest for a facility, citizens are unwilling to trust cultural and health risks decisions to government
officials.
The Minnesota Hazardous Waste Management Act should be
amended to include at a minimum: (1) statutory mechanisms to allow
citizens to negotiate directly with the state, county, and project developer; (2) community technical assistance grants to minimize the
impact of scientific issues in the negotiation process; (3) binding arbitration for settling disputes over contract terms; (4) provisions to
address cultural risk concerns, such as control over the facility, and
community authority to shut the facility down for serious repeat violations; and finally, (5) the scope of the Act should be broadened to
doctrine" exception to the commerce clause, states may now ban out-of-state wastes
from their government owned facilities, as long as the state is acting as a market
participant rather than a regulator. Kovacs & Anderson, States as Market Participantsin
Solid Waste Disposal Services-Fair Competition or The Destruction of The Private Sector?, 18
ENVrL. L. 779, 785-86 (1988).
178. Telephone interview with Bruce Brasaemle, staff, Office of Waste Management (Mar. 4, 1991).
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include landfills, incinerators, and other waste disposal technology.
The Act should also include private developers.
Although it appears unlikely that citizen opposition to the siting of
a hazardous waste facility will evaporate even with significant community controls and economic incentives, it is also apparent that the
Minnesota Siting Act has failed to recognize the degree of participatory democracy and control over risk events that citizens demand in a technological society.
Ann Brayt
t This Comment would not have been possible without the generous support
and encouragement of Professor Marcia Gelpe, William Mitchell College of Law.
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APPENDIX A: POLLUTION CONTROL CITIZEN SURVEY

Sex of Respondent
58%

Male
Female

42%

Age of Respondent
23 - 35
36 - 40
41 - 50
51 - 60
61 - 75
Not given

19%
21%
22%
22%
12%

3%
A

N

D

SD

1(1). One role of the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency's
mission is to prevent the release
of potentially harmful substances
into the environment.

SA2
70%

19%

2%

5%

4%

1(2). The Pollution Control
Agency does an adequate job of
protecting our community from
health risks.

2%

16%

7%

41%

34%

1(3). The local community
should make the final decision
when health risks are unknown.

39%

32%

7%

12%

11%

1(4). The Pollution Control
Agency favors business interests
over community concerns.

34%

39%

11%

14%

2%

1(5). Regardless of economic
benefit to the community,
agency staff should reject
activities if there are moderate
risks to public health.

53%

35%

5%

7%

0%

1(6). The Pollution Control
Agency collects enough
information about community
health risks.

2%

18%

9%

32%

39%

1. The percentages have been rounded up from decimal point five.
Consequently, they will not add up to 100%.
2. Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.
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1(7). The Citizen Board of the
Pollution Control Agency is too
close to the agency to
understand a citizen's point of
view.

27%

32%

30%

7%

4%

1(8). Our local government does
an adequate job of protecting
our community from health
risks.

4%

21%

5%

42%

28%

1(9). The Pollution Control
Agency uses scientific
information from citizens about
health risks.

0%

9%

0%

45%

20%

1(10). I understand how the
Pollution Control Agency
measures health risks.

7%

40%

15%

35%

4%

1 (11). Ultimately, the Pollution
Control Agency must make the
final decision about the location
of potential harmful activities.

7%

18%

9%

29%

38%

2. How important are each of the following impact areas when a
development is proposed in your area?
Very Somewhat Not at all
(1). The health impact on the community
2%
0%
98%
(2). The economic impact on the community 44%
51%
5%
(3). The social impact on the community
42%
4%
54%
3. If 100,000 people are exposed to an environmental activity for their
lifetime, and this activity results in one case of cancer, then this activity is:
High risk

Moderate risk

41%

20%

Low risk
39%

4. I am aware of the Environmental Rights Act:
Yes
No
61%
39%
5. Industry estimates of health risks are:
a. Much lower than actual risk
46%
b. Lower than actual risk
43%
c. Reasonably accurate
6%
d. Higher than actual risk
4%
e. Much higher than actual risk
2%
6. Industry activities can be environmentally risk free:
a. Strongly Agree
7%
41%
b. Agree
c. Neutral
9%
d. Disagree
33%
e. Strongly Disagree
9%
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7. Scientists can predict the harm caused by most chemicals:
4%
a. Very accurately
b. Accurately
30%
c. Not very well
48%
d. Not at all
19%
SA
49%

A
35%

N
4%

D
9%

SD
4%

8(2). Public hearings and
meetings have little effect on
final decisions made by the
Pollution Control Agency.
8(3). Citizen groups would be
more effective with legal help.

38%

33%

7%

16%

7%

36%

45%

16%

3%

0%

8(4). Citizens should be involved
in the collection of health risk
information.
8(5). Whenever the risk to the
community is low, I am less
concerned about the decision to
allow the activity in my area.

46%

40%

11%

2%

2%

5%

40%

11%

39%

5%

8(6). I feel public meetings have
a direct impact on the Pollution
Control Agency's decision
making.
8(7). Citizens can request an
environmental assessment of any
project.
8(8). Citizen groups would be
more effective with the help of
scientific experts.

5%

24%

10%

36%

24%

23%

40%

14%

19%

4%

40%

55%

3%

2%

0%

52%

33%

9%

7%

0%

8(1). Open public meetings are
the best way for the Pollution
Control Agency to understand
community concerns.

8(9). In my community, citizens
should be involved in the
enforcement of industry permits.

9. Please write in your job title or description.
10. How many years of schooling did you complete?
High School Vocational School Some College College Grad. or more
5%
5%
18%
72%
11. Environmental groups or community associations to which you
belong.
0 - 1 groups
24%
2-3
36%
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4-5
16%
6-8
12%.
9
3%
Not available
9%
12. In the past 12 months, about how many public meetings of the
Pollution Control Agency have you attended?
0 meetings
26%
1 -4
47%
5- 10
21%
11 -20
7%.
13. What do you see as barriers to effective public participation in the
decision-making process on environmental issues?
14. Is there anything else you would like to tell us with regard to the
Pollution Control Agency?
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AGENCY SURVEY

Sex of Respondent
Male
65%
Female
35%
Age of Respondent
26 - 35
36 - 40
41 - 45
46 - 51

Not given

8%
40%
36%
12%
4%
SA

A

N

1(1). At this time, environmental
decisions in our area are based
upon health risk information.

21%

53%

21%

6%

0%

1(2). Our division established an
efficient system for keeping track
of citizen input on environment
issues.

12%

47%

15%

24%

3%

1(3). One role of the Pollution
Control Agency's mission is to
prevent the release of potentially
harmful substances into the
environment.

42%

39%

9%

6%

3%

1(4). The social impact on a
community is as important as
health risks in environmental
decision making.

3%

27%

18%

44%

9%

1(5). Agency staff should
encourage the Citizen Board to
approve activities whenever the
risk to the community is low.

6%

30%

30%

27%

6%

1(6). Agency staff should place
more emphasis on community
concerns when health risks are
moderate.

0%

63%

16%

16%

6%

0%

D

1(7). The Citizen Board of the
Pollution Control Agency
promotes citizen participation in
decision making.

24%

54%

12%

9%

1(8). Citizen input in the permit
approval process should be
eliminated.

0%

0%

9%

30%
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1(9). Regardless of economic
benefit to the community,
agency staff should recommend
rejection of permits if there are
moderate risks to public health.

3%

44%

28%

22%

3%

1(10). Our division has
established a record keeping
system for information that is
received from businesses seeking
permits.

19%

45%

23%

10%

3%

2. About how often do health risk data provided by citizen groups
overcome industry data?
Never
Occasionally
About 50/50
Often
Always
10%
66%
14%
10%
0%
3. Information obtained from citizens at open public informational
meetings has:
a. No effect on PCA decision making
b. A small effect on PCA decision making
c. Contributes significantly to PCA decision
making
d. Is a very important factor in decision making
e. Is the most important factor in decision making

3%
24%
67%
6%
0%

4. If 100,000 people are exposed to an environmental activity for their
lifetime, and this exposure results in one case of cancer, then this activity
is:
a. High risk
13%
b. Moderate risk
25%
c. Low risk
61%
5. I am aware of the Environmental Rights Act:
Yes
56%

No
44%

6. The health risk information provided by citizen groups affects the final
decision in our area:
a. Never
9%
b. Occasionally
64%
c. About 50/50
9%
d. Often
18%
e. Always
0%
7. Information obtained from citizens at board meetings has:
a. No effect on PCA decision making
b. A small effect on PCA decision making
c. Contributes significantly to PCA decision
making
d. Is a very important factor in decision making
e. Is the most important factor in decision making
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8. How important are each of the following community impact areas when
considering decision making?
Very Somewhat N ot at all
0%
3%
(1). The health impact on a community
97%
75%
15%
(2). The economic impact on a
9%
community
25%
66%
9%
(3). The social impact on a community

9. The resources our division has available to independently verify
emission test results are:
a. More than adequate
b. Somewhat adequate
c. Somewhat inadequate
d. Completely inadequate

25%

10. Citizen groups provide valid technical data:
a. All of the time
b. Usually
c. Sometimes
d. Never

0%
3%
82%
15%

11. Scientists can predict the harm caused by most chemicals:
a. Very accurately
b. Accurately
c. Not very well
d. Not at all

41%

46%

18%

0%
59%
0%

12. Industry estimates of health risks are:
a. Much lower than actual risk
b. Lower than actual risk
c. Reasonably accurate
d. Higher than actual risk
e. Much higher than actual risk
SA

11%

3%
48%
48%
0%
0%
A

N

D

SD

13(1). Public meetings effectively
reduce community concerns
about Pollution Control
Agency's decisions.

0%

35%

18%

41%

6%

13(2). Open public meetings are
the best way to collect
information about community
environmental concerns.

3%

35%

21%

29%

12%

13(3). The process used by the
Pollution Control Agency when
making environmental risk
decisions is well understood by
the public.

0%

0%

12%

68%

21%
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13(4). The public is confident of
the Pollution Control Agency's
ability to protect community
health.
13(5). Public involvement in the
risk assessment procedure tends
to frustrate agency staff.
13(6). Industry does an adequate
job of informing citizens of
health risks.
13(7). Citizens should be
involved in the enforcement of
industry permits.

[Vol. 17

0%

29%

32%

32%

6%

6%

53%

21%

15%

6%

0%

6%

30%

39%

24%

6%

41%

24%

29%

0%

14. How many years of schooling did you complete?
College Grad.
Post Grad.
47%
53%
15. My job includes work with technical risk/permit assessment.
Yes
No

70%

30%

16. How many other departments or agencies do you work with on
permit applications?
17. In the past 12 months, about how many public meetings of the
Pollution Control Agency have you attended?
0- 1
2- 3
4-5
6-8
9

12%
32%
9%
18%
29%

18(a). In your job, about how many times per month do you come in
contact with the public?
0- 10
11 -30
31 -50

35%
50%
9%

51 -64

3%

99 or more

3%

18(b). In your job, about how many times per month do you come in
contact with industry personnel?
0- 10
41%
11 - 30
44%
31 -50
9%
51 -64
3%
99 or more
3%
19. Is there anything else you would like to tell us with regard to the
Pollution Control Agency?
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